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ABSTRACT. I defend an ontological distinction between three kinds of relation: internal, 
external and grounded relations. Even though, as we shall see, this trichotomy  is basic, it is not 
found in influential contemporary metaphysics. Specifically, the widespread tendency, 
exemplified notably by David Armstrong, of not recognizing grounded relations as distinct from 
external relations, can be shown to be mistaken. I propose a definition of each of the three kinds 
of relation. Of vital importance to the parsimony of metaphysics, I also argue that only external 
relations are ontologically fundamental. 
 
1. Introduction  
Consider relations such as being larger than holding between 20 and 15, being darker 
than holding between navy and cobalt, and being contrary to holding between 
triangularity and squareness.1 Contrast these with relations such as being in front of 
holding between the chair and the desk, standing next to holding between Sam and Kim; 
and being earlier than holding between Caesar’s 18th-year birthday and his crossing the 
Rubicon.2 A familiar view in contemporary metaphysics (cf. e.g. Armstrong 1997, 2004; 
                                                 
1 It may well be that internal relations also include formal or topic-neutral relations, such as instantiation 
and entailment, in addition to the ‘topic-specific’ ones mentioned here. For a detailed examination of this 
and related issues, see Mulligan (1998).  
 
2 Note that the classification of this last example with the two preceding cases presupposes that the times of 
events are not essential to them (cf. sec. 2 below). This is a contentious view. Lawrence Brian Lombard 
(1986, 213ff) argues that an event’s time of occurrence is essential to it. Lewis (1983) denies this, though 
for reasons that are intimately linked to his particular metaphysics. Who is right? Perhaps, as Bennett 
(1988, 60ff) maintains, there are no ‘hard’ facts of the matter to enable us to find out. 
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Mulligan 1998), call it the Standard View, is that the former kind of relations are internal 
and the latter are external and this distinction is exhaustive and mutually exclusive. 
However, I shall argue that there are not just two basic kinds of relation, but three: in 
addition to internal relations, there are two kinds of non-internal relation: external and 
grounded relations. I shall additionally argue that only external relations are ontologically 
fundamental. This has the added attraction that we only need to include this kind of 
relation in our ontological economy. The reason for this is that, other things being equal, 
arguably only ontologically fundamental entities are a cost in this economy. Given this, 
my position is of course just as ontologically parsimonious as the Standard View 
conjoined with the claim that only external relations are ontologically fundamental in the 
sense at issue (Armstrong 1997, 2004). 
 
2. Internal and external relations 
Our first task is to define internal and external relations properly. Roughly, an internal 
relation is a relation that is entailed by its relata. Hence, an internal relation is such that 
two entities with logical necessity must stand in it.3 Armstrong (1997, 12) accordingly 
defines a relation as being internal if and only if ‘it is impossible that the terms should 
exist and the relation not exist’, where the coexistence of the terms is possible. Or, as he 
puts it even more succinctly, a relation is internal when ‘given just the terms of the 
relation, the relation between them is necessitated’ (2004, 9). I suggest that the modality 
involved here is logical. So I propose the following definition (cf. Johansson 1989, 117):  
 
                                                 
3 For convenience of exposition, I shall, as is conventional in the literature, speak only about dyadic 
relations, assuming that what I say holds, mutatis mutandis, for the polyadic for n  2. 
 Distinguishing Internal, External and Grounded Relations 3
(IR) A relation is internal iff it is logically impossible for its relata to coexist  
 without the relation holding between them.  
Thus, it is logically impossible for 20 and 15 to coexist without being larger than holding 
between them; for navy and cobalt to coexist without being darker than holding between 
them; and for triangularity and squareness to coexist without being contrary to holding 
between them. 
 Let us now turn to external relations. If one divides all relations into internal and 
external ones, then one can of course define them simply as ‘not internal’. A negative 
definition of external relations as simple as this can be found in Armstrong (e.g. 1997, 
87). Kevin Mulligan mentions another example of such a definition: ‘A relation is said to 
be external if it need not relate the entities it does relate (Maria need not be next to Sam).’ 
(1995, 246).  A more detailed definition is found in Russell:  
 
I maintain that there are such facts as that x has relation R to y, and that such facts are not in 
general reducible to, or inferable from, a fact about x only and a fact about y only: they do not 
imply that x and y have any complexity, or any intrinsic property distinguishing them from a z 
and a w which do not have the relation R. This is what I mean when I say relations are 
external. (1910, 374) 
 
This definition is obviously also negative. But it adds to the above simple definition the 
substantial claim that there could be particulars exactly similar to the relata of an external 
relation which do not stand in it (i.e. particulars x and y without ‘any complexity,  or any 
intrinsic property distinguishing them from a z and a w which do not have’ this relation) . 
I will employ this addition to define external relations for the purposes of this paper. By 
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‘exact similarity’ I understand this: two entities x and y are exactly similar if and only if 
they have all of their properties in common, i.e. for all properties P, x has P iff y has P.4 
Call exactly similar entities ‘duplicates’. Thus, I suggest that (cf. Johansson 1989, 119):  
 
(ER) A relation is external iff it is logically possible for duplicates of its relata to  
    coexist without the relation holding between them.  
 
For instance, it is clearly logically possible for duplicates of my chair and desk to coexist 
without being in front of holding between them, or for duplicates of Sam and Kim to exist 
without being next to holding between them, and it is (perhaps, cf. footnote 2) logically 
possible for duplicates of Caesar’s 18th-year birthday and his crossing the Rubicon to 
coexist without being earlier than holding between them. These examples of traditionally 
‘external’ relations are therefore also classified as external on my view.  
 
3. Grounded relations: neither internal nor external 
But from this alone we cannot conclude or assume, in line with the Standard View, that 
external relations are the only kind of non-internal relation. For there is a second kind of 
non-internal relation, which I call grounded relations, following Ingvar Johansson (1999, 
ch. 8; cf. Campbell 1990, ch. 5). Many contemporary philosophers (e.g. Armstrong 1997, 
2004; Vallicella 2002; cf. Mulligan 1998) only distinguish between external and internal 
relations (i.e. the term ‘external relations’ is often used both for what I call ‘external 
relations’ and ‘grounded relations’), and therefore crudely categorize as external relations 
                                                 
4 Here, as elsewhere in this paper, I consider only non-relational properties, since I believe relational 
properties are spurious.  
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those relations that are grounded and (hence, given what I shall argue in the next section, 
mistakenly consider them ontologically fundamental).5  
 Roughly, a grounded relation is a relation that is entailed by certain contingent 
properties of its relata. Examples are being taller than holding between Kim who is 5ft 
11ins and Sam who is 5ft 9ins and being happier than holding between Sam and Kim 
when Sam is happier than Kim. It is contingent that Kim and Sam have the heights they 
actually have, so it is possible (at least logically) that Kim is not taller than Sam, and it is 
similarly contingent that Kim and Sam have the levels of happiness they actually have, so 
it is possible (at least logically) that Sam is not happier than Kim. Hence, it is logically 
possible that Kim and Sam coexist without the grounded relation holding between them. 
But it is not similarly possible for particulars exactly similar to them (now) to coexist 
without the relation holding between them. Aiming for the same level of generality as in 
the previous definitions, I therefore suggest the following (cf. Johansson ibid. 120): 
 
(GR) A relation is grounded iff it is logically impossible for duplicates of its (actual)  
    relata to coexist without the relation holding between them.  
 
This completes our tricomoty of relations. I consider it to be exhaustive: any relation is 
either internal or external or grounded.  The distinction between each of the three kinds of 
relation is also exclusive; specifically, by (IR), (ER) and (GR), the pairs ‘internal’ and 
                                                 
5 Note, however, that Armstrong in his early work on universals (1978) does not have this view. His notion 
of an internal relation there is very much like my notion of a grounded relation: ‘Two or more particulars 
are internally related if and only if there exist properties of the particulars which logically necessitate that 
the relation holds’ (ibid., 85). By contrast, it seems quite unclear what his 1978 view of an internal relation 
in our (and his) present sense is.   
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‘external’, ‘internal’ and ‘grounded’ and ‘external’ and ‘grounded’, respectively, are 
contraries. 
 However, both grounded and external relations are non-internal, and this is one 
reason why the distinction between them can easily be overlooked. Equally, one can 
easily overlook the distinction between grounded and internal relations. For instance, 
being darker than, which I mentioned as an example of an internal relation, also seems to 
be an example of a grounded relation: it might, for example, hold between Sam’s shirt 
and Kim’s blouse when the former is navy and the latter is cobalt. But since, I shall 
assume, no relation can be internal in some cases and grounded (not internal) in others, 
we should hold that there are two relations which just have the same name (relation 
nominal); in the example, ‘being darker than’.6  
 The relationship between an internal relation and a homonymous grounded one is 
intimate, however. To see this, we need first to analyse grounded relations. Consider 
again our initial example of being taller than holding between Kim and Sam when Kim is 
5ft 11ins and Sam is 5ft 9ins. Let us say that Kim is 5ft 11ins if and only if the fact of 
Kim’s being 5ft 11ins exists and that Sam is 5ft 9ins if and only if the fact of Sam’s being 
5ft 9ins  exists. But these two facts do not jointly suffice to ground being taller than. (I 
speak here in the material mode of ‘grounding’ rather than in the equivalent semantic 
                                                 
6 It is beyond the scope of this paper to defend this assumption. I make it only for the sake of argument. 
However, it should be noted that one might attempt to defend it by arguing that internal and grounded 
relations are universals. Since a universal is numerically identical in each of its instantiations, by the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, no relational universal is both internal and grounded. However, as I shall 
argue below, internal and grounded relations are reducible (in a sense to be specified) and therefore in my 
view not universals (cf. Armstrong 1997, 2004). But if they were not so reducible, they would, I believe, be 
universals. 
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modus of ‘truthmaking’, for the simple reason that grounded relations are, as their name 
obviously shows, conceptualized in the former.) A further condition is needed, viz. that 
5ft 11ins is taller than (or more than) 5ft 9ins. This condition is of course an internal 
relation holding between the two heights. Similarly in other cases: in addition to the two 
facts that are instantiations of the two relevant contingent properties, these properties 
need to stand in a characteristic relation.7 In many, perhaps most, cases, the properties 
will be quantities related by an internal relation, such as being taller than (or more than) 
holding between 5ft 11ins and 5ft 9ins. 
 Now it is easy to see what the relationship is between a grounded relation RG and an 
internal relation RI with the same name: the grounded relation holds if and only if the 
internal relation is the very internal relation that is involved in its grounding. For 
example, the grounded relation of being darker than holds between Sam’s shirt and 
Kim’s blouse if and only if the internal relation of being darker than holds between the 
colour of Sam’s shirt and the colour of Kim’s blouse. 
 Someone who accepts a traditional dichotomy of relations (internal vs. external) 
might object to our trichotomy as follows. Firsly, appealing to the broad, traditional sense 
of external relation we encountered above (‘a relation is external if it need not relate the 
entities it relates’), she could say that the relation of being darker than between Sam’s 
shirt and Kim’s blouse is external (it need not hold between them, since Sam’s shirt and 
Kim’s blouse could have been the same shirt and the same blouse, but have been dyed 
differently). Secondly, she could maintain that the ‘grounding’ of this relation in the 
                                                 
7 In my view, instantiations of properties (and relations) are facts or states of affairs (cf. Meinertsen 2008). 
However, nothing in this paper presupposes this ontology. For our present purposes, the notion of facts and 
its associated locutions can be taken as heuristic. 
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actual colours of the shirt and the blouse is due not to a third kind or category of relation, 
but simply to the fact that the colour of the shirt is darker than the colour of the blouse 
(such that the internal relation of being darker than holds between these actual colours). 
She might add that this not only coheres with, but also explains my point about the 
equivocity of ‘being darker than’.8  
 If one takes this line, with only one kind of non-internal relation, which as it were is 
on a par with the internal one, it seems reasonable to require that one explain why the 
initial relation of being darker than between the items of clothing is external (in the 
traditional sense) in the first place.  
 The proponent of the objection construes this explanandum as equivalent to the 
question of where the contingency of the relation comes from. She maintains that it 
comes from the contingency of the fact that Sam’s shirt has the colour it actually has and 
the contingency of the fact that Kim’s blouse has the colour it actually has.9  
  It is correct that the facts that ‘ground’ the obtaining of the internal relation are 
contingent in this way in the example at issue, as well as in all other cases of grounded 
relations (in my sense). And although it is by no means obvious that ‘externality’ and 
contingency are equivalent in the required way, I shall assume for the sake of argument 
that they are. Given this, one might indeed say that precisely because the grounding facts 
are contingent, the contingency or ‘externality’ of the initial relation of being darker than 
                                                 
8 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for Grazer Philosophische Studien for what in essence is this 
objection to my position, and I shall consider it in the remainder of this section.  
 
9 In addition, she construes the colours of the particulars as tropes. However, it seems to me that the 
objection does require that one accepts tropes.  
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between the items of clothing is explained. Yet no third category or kind of relation has 
been invoked.  
 However, this explanation replies on an unfounded assumption, namely, the view that 
the contingency of the grounding facts explains why the intial relation is ‘external’ – by 
bestowing their modality on this relation, as it were.  Or, to put it in a more ontological 
way, the claim is that the intial relation is ‘external’ in virtue of the grounding facts being 
contingent. But there is no reason why the necessity of the relevant internal relation 
should not just as well mean that the intial relation be internal, rather than ‘external’, 
which obviously it is not. This explanation therefore fails.  
 I am not aware of any alternative explanans. Fortunately, given our trichotomy, we 
need not account for the modality of grounded relations by contingent facts about their 
relata, or by any other facts for that matter. Since they are a third sui generis kind of 
relation (although ultimately reducible, in a sense to be specified below) their modality 
does not call for an explanation. 
 
4. Relations and ontological fundamentality 
Our definitions of internal, external and grounded relations neatly enable us to argue that 
only the second kind of entity is ontologically fundamental. What do I mean by 
‘ontologically fundamental’? For our purposes, for an entity to be ontologically 
fundamental is for it to exist at the level of truthmakers (cf. Armstrong 1997, 2004). For 
an entity to exist at the level of truthmakers is, roughly, for it to be a (proper or improper) 
part of the truthmaker of a statement. I shall say that an entity that (conversely) does not 
exist at this level is truthmaker-reducible (TM-reducible). For instance, on (‘extreme’) 
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nominalism, if ‘a has relation R to b’ is true, then R is TM-reducible: it is neither a proper 
nor improper part of the truthmaker of this (or any other) statement. On realism, by 
contrast, R is not TM-reducible, since it is a part of the truthmaker of this statement (in 
my view, the state of affairs of a’s having R to b). 10 Similarly for the monadic case on 
either nominalism or realism. This truthmaker-based view of ontological fundamentality 
is broadly Armstrongian (cf. ibid.). It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain it any 
further. Fortunately, however, if we can define the three kinds of relation satisfactorily, 
the present sketch suffices for the additional objective of separating external relations 
from internal and grounded relations in the required sense of ontological fundamentality. 
All we need is the view that the truthmaker of a true statement s that states or expresses 
an internal or grounded relation, E*, does not include E*; but if s states or expresses an 
external relation, it does. 
 Consider first internal relations. It is logically impossible for any of these pairs of 
relata to coexist without the relation holding between them. Hence, these pairs make true 
the statements that state or express the internal relations, such as ‘triangularity is contrary 
to squareness’, i.e. the internal relations are not included in the truthmakers of these 
statements. Thus, they are TM-reducible. Although they are ‘basic’, in the sense of being 
theoretically important in metaphysics, they are not ontologically fundamental. This is of 
course an economically welcome result. 
 By contrast, it obviously follows from (ER) that external relations are TM-
irreducible, or equivalently, instantiations of them are needed as truthmakers of 
                                                 
10 Provided of course that, as Armstrong has emphasized , R is part of  the ‘scientific’, as opposed to the 
‘manifest’, image of the world – a fact which we determine a posteriori. 
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statements that an external relation is holding.11 They are, therefore, ontologically 
fundamental. 
 What about grounded relations? Does the grounded relation stated or expressed by a 
true statement exist at the level of truthmakers? No. The grounding or truthmaking of a 
grounded relation RG holding between a and b involves merely the instantiation of the 
relevant contingent properties by a and b, in conjunction with the specific internal 
relation RI holding between these properties. To put it more formally, if the fact of RI(F, 
G) & (Fa & Gb) exists, then the statement ‘a stands in RG to b’ is true – i.e. the former is 
the truthmaker of the latter. In our example, if the fact of 5ft 11ins being more than 5ft 9 
ins & (Kim’s being 5ft 11 ins & Sam’s being 5ft 9 ins) exists, then it makes true ‘Kim is 
taller than Sam’. There is no grounded relation at the truthmaker level. Thus, grounded 
relations are not ontologically fundamental.12 
 
5. Conclusion 
If what I have argued in this paper is correct, there are not two basic kinds of relation, but 
three: internal, external, and grounded relations. The Standard View is thus crude in its 
failing to distinguish the last kind from internal relations on the one hand, and from 
external relations on the other. However, I argued that grounded relations do not exist at 
                                                 
11 Again, provided that the relations in case are part of the ‘scientific’ image of the world (cf. footnote 7). 
 
12 Note that my analysis of grounded relations shows us that my view of internal and grounded relations as 
reducible (in the sense of TM-reducible), should not be confused with the view that they (and external 
relations) are ‘reducible to (non-relational) properties of their relata’ in the sense of ‘foundationism’ (the 
properties in case being ‘foundations’ for the relation). I believe this view is untenable, cf. Russell (1903). 
Contrast this with the contemporary defence of foundationism of Keith Campbell (‘The Place of Relations 
in a Trope Philosophy’, MS). 
 
 Distinguishing Internal, External and Grounded Relations 12
the level of truthmakers, and that, ironically, this view is nonetheless thus correct that 
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